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ABSTRACT: We review recent theoretical literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in 
terms of welfare impact, of currently applied sanctioning regimes for cartels by 
Competition Authorities (CAs). We then provide a comparison of the regimes taking 
also into account criteria related to ease of implementation and transparency. We 
argue the case for switching to a penalty regime, in which the penalty base continues 
to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue but in which, in contrast 
1 We are grateful to Joe Harrington, Frederic Jenny, Tom Ross, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Simon Roberts 
as well as the participants of the 12th Annual CRESSE Conference (July 2017) and the GDEC-CRESSE 
International Workshop on Advances in Competition Policy (Rio de Janeiro, November 2017) for helpful 
comments on our papersrelated to the subject of antitrust sanctioning. Also, we are grateful to the Tin-
bergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Short-term Visitor Program for the financial support. 
 Corresponding Author: Yannis Katsoulacos
 E-mail address: yanniskatsoulacos@gmail.com
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: should there be a common approach to sanctioning...
2Rev. Econ. Contemp., v. 23, n. 2, p. 1 -20, mai./ago. 2019: e192321 DOI: 10.1590/198055272321
to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in order 
to calculate damages in private damage claims, that is, the overcharge rate.
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APLICAÇÃO DA LEGISLAÇÃO ANTIMONOPÓLIO 
PÚBLICA E PRIVADA AOS CARTÉIS: DEVE HAVER 
UMA ABORDAGEM COMUM PARA SANCIONAR 
COM BASE NA TAXA DE SOBRETAXAS?
RESUMO: Analisamos a literatura teórica recente que aponta para a ineficácia, em 
termos de impacto no bem-estar, dos regimes de sanção atualmente aplicados aos car-
téis pelas Autoridades de Concorrência (ACs). Em seguida, fornecemos uma compa-
ração dos regimes levando em conta critérios relacionados à facilidade de implemen-
tação e transparência. Argumentamos a favor da mudança para um regime de 
penalidade, no qual a base de penalidade continua a ser a atual penalidade dominante 
da receita do cartel, mas em que, diferentemente da prática atual, a penalidade é base-
ada na taxa comumente estimada para calcular os danos em sinistros de danos priva-
dos, isto é, a taxa de sobretaxa.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: penalidades antitruste; aplicação de leis antitruste; lei anti-
truste; cartéis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The imposition of sanctions have been regarded as the most important ex ante public 
enforcement instrument that Competition Authorities (hereafter CAs) can use in 
antitrust and, more specifically, cartel violations.2 It is complemented by private 
enforcement in the form of private damage actions. In principle, by imposing sanctions 
for infringements, public enforcement’s main objective is to deter violations (deterrence 
effect) and to induce non-deterred colluding firms to charge lower prices (price effect), 
while private damages focus on compensating those who have suffered harm. Clearly, 
each method can contribute to the objectives of the other. Public enforcement can 
facilitate and stimulate private damage actions and private damage actions can contribute 
to deterrence and provide incentives to customers to discover and report price-fixing. 
This paper reviews recent literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in terms of their 
welfare impact,3 of currently employed monetary penalty schemes by CAs,4 and argues 
the case for CAs switching to a more effective penalty regime, in which the penalty base 
continues to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue, but, in which, in 
contrast to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in 
order to calculate damages in private damage actions, that is, the overcharge rate.
The extensive and still growing literature by economists on monetary penalty 
regimes5 examines and compares alternative types of such regimes, concentrating on a 
comparison of their welfare properties. It is nevertheless recognised that, while this 
2 The theory of sanctioning on dominant firm abuses is still undeveloped. Other important ex ante instru-
ments of competition law enforcement in the area of cartels are the prohibition of facilitating practices 
(which can increase the viability of cartels), and the use of merger policy (to reduce the likelihood of 
cartels emerging after mergers). Ex post measures include the improvement of detection and prosecution 
rates, the adoption of measures to prevent recidivism and the application of leniency policies.
3 The continuing high prevalence of cartels across markets, confirmed by extensive empiricalevidencealso 
testifies to this. See e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2011, 2012, 2014), Schinkel (2007), Veljanovski (2007), Con-
nor and Lande (2008), Allain et al. (2011), Boyer and Kotchoni (2015) or Spagnolo and Marvão (2016) for 
an overview. This, of course, is not the only potential inadequacy in public enforcement and recent literature 
has also pointed to the ineffectiveness of monetary penalties, as currently applied, in inducing desirable 
price effects – see Bageri et al. (2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) and Katsoulacos et al. (2015).
4 There is a variety of different types of sanctions with different emphasis placed on each type over time 
and in different countries. Here we concentrate on monetary penalties on corporations. The other main 
types of sanctions in public enforcement are: financial penalties on managers involved in price-fixing, 
criminal sanctions/imprisonment of individuals involved in price-fixing, and debarment of individuals 
involved in price-fixing, from further employment in a position from which they could again violate 
antitrust laws. See for a review Katsoulacos et al. (2017).
5 See e.g. Harrington (2004, 2005), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Harrington (2010), Houba et al. 
(2010), Bageri et al. (2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), Dargaud et al. (2015), Katsoulacos et al.(2015, 
2017), Bos et al. (2017).
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comparison is very important, in order for it to have practical policy significance, a 
number of other policy-relevant dimensions of the regimes have to be assessed and 
compared. Specifically, a more complete comparison must take into account the 
following three dimensions / assessment criteria:
i) Implementability. This involves considerations relating to the administrative 
cost of the penalty regime,6 the extent to which it minimises delays in the CA 
enforcement process7 and the extent to which it minimises the costs of appeals 
in the judicial review process.8 The latter will be higher the more the appeals 
that are induced, against the CA’s penalty decisions, by a penalty regime. The 
number of appeals will be greater the more likely it is that the penalty regime 
can lead to estimation errors and/or when penalty decisions can be easily 
challenged as being discriminatory.
ii) Transparency/Certainty. Penalty regimes differ in terms of how easily and 
accurately firms can predict the fine that they will be facing if they are 
prosecuted and are found to violate the law. When firms cannot predict the 
estimates of penalties that the CA will make, were it to investigate and condemn 
their conduct,there is a lack of transparency or uncertainty.9 We consider 
transparency/certainty a desirable feature of a penalty regime taking the view 
of a large number of jurisdictions (including the EC, US, Canada and Brazil) 
that to achieve deterrence targets the agencies must rely on the threat of severe 
penalties coupled with a significant fear of detection. While it is known that in 
a few cases agencies adopt the view that some uncertainty can improve 
deterrence, when detection rates are low and the severity of penalties is 
constrained, this approach is recognised to have serious downsides.10
6 The cost required in order to collect the necessary information and to undertake the estimation of the 
penalty by the CA and the firms.
7 The more the information required and the more difficult it is to obtain reliable data on this information 
the more lengthy will be the process of estimation and hence the greater the delay in reaching decisions. 
8 That is, the cost for the CA of defending its decisions in Courts of Appeal and the cost that the firms have 
to incur when appealing against the CA’s decisions.
9 Since penalties are generally calculated as a fraction of a ‘penalty base’ (such as revenues or profits) and 
since penalty guidelines only specify that this fraction (the ‘penalty rate’) will fall within a range that will 
depend on a large number of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, there is always some uncertainty 
in predicting the CA’s penalty estimate in any specific case. This uncertainty increases as it becomes more 
difficult to obtain accurate estimates of the ‘penalty base’ and to calculate the appropriate ‘penalty rate’.
10 Thus, it may lead to under deterrence when lower penalties are mistakenly anticipated by potential offend-
ers or over deterrence when innocent agreements are deterred by overestimating fines. Further, and very 
importantly in practice, the less discretion an agency has (limiting uncertainty) the less the degree of litiga-
tion on the amount of the fine by companies fined and the lower the risk of being accused of discrimination 
and public criticism of subjectivity and arbitrariness. See for details on this ICN Report (2008). 
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iii) Welfare properties. As noted above, it is on these that the economic literature has 
concentrated. While the traditional literature identified first-best optimal penalties 
(BECKER, 1968; LANDE, 1983), emphasizing their deterrence properties, the 
more recent literature has focused on comparing penalty regimes in a second-best 
world. It is then assumed that, as is true in practice, penalties cannot be set to deter 
all or even most cartels.11 It is then important, in addition to the deterrence effect, 
to address also the price effects of the penalty regimes on cartels that are not deterred. 
An extensive recent comparison of the welfare properties of most of the penalty 
regimes described below is contained in Katsoulacos et al. (2015).
Clearly, a penalty regime is better than another one if it is easier to implement, it 
generates less uncertainty and has a superior overall welfare impact. Unfortunately, 
regimes that are superior in terms of their welfare properties are not superior (and may 
be inferior) in terms of the other assessment criteria. This makes it difficult to translate 
results regarding the welfare properties of different regimes into proposals concerning 
which of these regimes should be adopted and implemented by CAs in practice.
Most CAs throughout the world have advocated simple revenue-based monetary 
penalties for cartels.12 Many countries also explicitly provide in their statutes for the 
imposition of penalties based on illegal gains (indeed 9 out of the 17 countries that 
participated in the ICN survey in 2008 including US and China).13 Penalties based on 
illegal gains can either take the place of revenue-based penalties (as in US) or they can 
constitute an additional penalty that is combined with the revenue-based penalty in 
order to reach the overall penalty figure imposed on law violators (as in China). 
However, illegal gains-based penalties are rarely implemented – for example, in the 
US,the imposition of a penalty based on illegal gains has been implementedin only one 
case.14 Nevertheless, in some younger jurisdictions, in which competition law in 
11 For example, due to bankruptcy considerations, and in order not to violate the legal ‘proportionality principle’, 
most countries have legal ceilings on antitrust fines set as a % of annual turnover. These may well make penal-
ties insufficient and antitrust policies either completely ineffective or at best partially effective in such a way 
that only low prices are deterred, while high prices are still sustainable. See e.g. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), 
Harrington (2010), Bageri et al. (2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), Houba et al. (2017) for details. 
12 See for example Bageri and Katsoulacos (2014). As noted in the ICN Report (2008) ‘the general view 
been that turnover/volume of affected commerce provides a good proxy for assessing the gravity of the 
behavior, both in terms of damage to consumers and illegal gain. Furthermore, such data is relatively easy 
to obtain’ (p. 19).
13 See ICN Report (2008, p. 19). For an earlier detailed overview of the penalty structures implemented in 
OECD countries see the OECD (2002) report on fines.
14 As we have been informed in a private communication with Greg Werden. This is generally true as also 
found in the survey of the ICN (Report 2008).
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relation to the imposition of sanctions is formulated, CAs have opted for including 
illegal gains-based penalties as a potential additional element that can be taken into 
account in calculating monetary penalties.15 However, this has not improved the 
implementation record of illegal gains-based penalties because of difficulties in their 
estimation and the uncertainty that they create.16
Most of the literature on the optimal design of antitrust monetary penalties has 
focused on four main regimes: damages-based regime, illegal gains-based regime, 
revenue–based regime and overcharge–based regime. In a recent paper, Katsoulacos et 
al. (2017) also examine a fifth alternative regime, the sophisticated revenue-based 
penalty regime. In this case, the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel, but the penalty 
rate depends on (and increases with) the cartel overcharge rate. Finally, we should 
recognise that the literature on estimating private damage claims proposes they are 
based on a simplified version of the damages-based penalty. Therefore, this, as well as a 
simplified version of an illegal gains-based regime,17 have to be included in a full 
comparison. Below, we turn to a comparison of these seven potential penalty regimes.
2. BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISONS OFTHE MAIN MONETARY PENALTY REGIMES
Let us assume that ( ),C Cp Q represent the cartel price and output, while the (potentially 
imperfectly competitive) ‘but-for’ price and output are ( ),B Bp Q , and c is the marginal 
cost (‘but-for’ price under perfect competition). C C CR p Q=  is the cartel revenue 
(turnover), while B B BR p Q=  is the but-for revenue. Consider first the following five 
potential penalties , , , , ,iF i D G R O SR= .18
15 For example, on June 17, 2016, the Chinese CA enforcing law in the area of price-related anticompetitive 
conduct (NDRC) published ‘Draft Guidelines on the Determination of Illegal Gains and Fines in Rela-
tion to Undertakings’ Monopoly Conduct, which are expected to be introduced formally this year. With 
these, the NDRC attempts to make illegal-gains an important part of penalty setting in China - this has 
been commended by Koren W Wong-Ervin et al. (2016) – though in the past, the Chinese authorities 
have tried to calculate illegal gains in setting penalties in only about 10% of the cases. Also, the Chilean 
Competition Authority (FNE) has adopted penalties based on illegal gains in 2014.
16 ‘Difficult to be estimated’ and ‘Easy to be challenged’ is the standard way of explaining why penalties 
based on illegal gains are rarely used. Appendix 1 also provides more formal analysis to support these 
arguments. See, for the case of China, Deng and Katsoulacos (2017).
17 If a simplified version of a damages-based regime is admitted in the comparison, it is hard to justify not 
to include also a simplified version of the illegal gains – based regime. 
18 For a diagrammatic representation of the first two regimes see also Appendix 1. 
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i) Damages-based penalties ( )DF . These were proposed in the seminal article of 
Becker (1968) examining first-best optimal penalties – under the assumption 
that the enforcing agency’s objective is to maximise (total) social welfare. In 
this case, penalties should be the damages (D), which refer to the total consumer 
welfare harm caused by the cartel price increase over the (counterfactual or) 
but-for competitive level, including the deadweight welfare loss triangle (L) 
associated with the reduction in the volume of output by the cartel. Thus:
 (1)
In (1), ( ) /C B Bp p pθ = −  is the proportional overcharge.
ii) Illegal gains (or profit)-based penalties ( )GF . These were early identified for 
their welfare properties, their adoption was proposed most forcefully by Lande 
(1983) for cases in which the objective is to deter conduct that does not generate 
any efficiencies (such as price fixing), in order to deter the reduction in 
consumer surplus that results from such conduct. Illegal gains are defined as 
cartel’s profits over and above the counterfactual level of profits.19 Thus:
 (2)
In (2) Q∆  is the reduction in output caused by the cartel and m is the absolute 
profit margin in the but-for situation, that is, the difference between but-for 
price and marginal cost.20
iii) Revenue–based penalties ( )RF . As already mentioned, these are the penalties 
most often adopted and implemented by CAs throughout the world. They are 
calculated as a multiple of actual cartel revenue, in which the fixed multiplier or 
penalty rate ( )Rρ  falls within a range that depends on a large number of 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.21 Thus:
 (3)
19 In the special case in which the counterfactual price is the marginal cost (competitive price), the illegal 
gains are the same as the cartel profits. 
20 In Diagram 1 of Appendix 1 this is the area (A-B).
21 Duration of the cartel is one of the aggravating circumstances. Some authorities use a revenue figure that 
is an estimate of the revenue in all years that the cartel was in place.
( ) 1
C B C C
DF D p p Q L R L
θ
θ
 = = − + = + + 
( ) 1
C B C C
GF p p Q m Q R m Q
θ
θ
 = − − ∆ = − ∆ + 
C
R RF Rρ=
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iv) Overcharge-based penalties ( )OF . These are calculated as a multiple of the 
‘but-for’ revenue RΒ . If Oρ  is the penalty rate in this case, then
  (4)22
v) Sophisticated revenue-based penalties ( )SRF . These use the revenue of the 
cartel as base, but the penalty rate depends on (and increases with) the cartel 
overcharge rate. Thus, if SRρ  is the penalty rate (written as a function of the 
overcharge):
 (5)
We next turn to note the value of damages ( )D  as estimated in private damage 
claims.23 According to the usual approach, estimates of damages in such claims are 
obtained by neglecting L in (1), so that:
 (6)
This is similar to (5), i.e. the penalty under a sophisticated revenue-based regime. 
A penalty based on this estimate of damages, i.e.
1 11 1
C
D DF D R F D E
θ θ
θ θ
   = = = =   + +   
    (6’)
Is much easier to calculate thanin (1).
So (6)/(6’) is a simplified version of the damages-based penalty regime. We return to 
this below. As indicated above, we should also include a simplified version of the illegal 
gains-based penalty regimein the comparison. This is given by a simplified version of 
(2), in which L is neglected:
 (2’)
22 In the special case in which the counterfactual / competitive price is the marginal cost (c) this is given by:
( )
( )( ) 11
C
O O
Q c
F R
Q c
θρ
θθ
 =  ++  
.
23 She Brander and Ross (2006, 2017).
O OF Rρ θ
Β=
( ) CSR SRF Rρ θ=
( )1 1
C B C CD p p Q Rθ
θ
 = − =  + 

1
C
GF R
θ =  + θ 
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Table 1 shows the information required for calculating the above penalties. The 
information required is categorised as Observable (O) or Unobservable (U) and in 
accordance with the difficulty in getting the information as H: High, M: Medium and 
L: Low. This allows the comparison between different penalty regimes in terms of the 
criteria of implementability and transparency. 
Table 1 – Information required for the calculation of alternative penalties
Penalty 
(equation)
Information 
Required 
Revenue-
based
(3)
Sophisticated 
revenue-
-based
(5)
Over
charge-
based
(4)
Illegal 
gains-
based
(2)
Damages-
based
(1)
Simplified
damages-
and illegal 
gains-based 
(6’) and (2’)
Cartel revenue
( );C C Cp Q R O L= X X  X X X
Cartel volume of sales, 
( );CQ O L
X
(for Q∆ )
X
(for L)
Counterfactual price and, 
hence, Overcharge
( ) ( )/ ;C B Bp p p U Hθ = −
X X X X X
Counterfactual volume of 
sales ( );BQ U H X
X
(for Q∆ )
X
(for L)
Cost Information 
( )( );c U H
X
(for m)
Information about Demand 
Structure ( );U H X X X
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
2.1. COMPARISONS: IMPLEMENTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
According to Table 1, other than cartel revenue (which is the only information required 
by the simple revenue-based penalty regime) and the cartel volume of sales, which are 
observable and obtainable at low cost, all other information required for implementing 
the other penalty regimes is unobservable and obtainable at a medium to high cost. 
The following comments can be made regarding the properties of implementability 
and transparency from Table 1.
Damages-based penalties: since these include the deadweight welfare loss L, 
clearly, they are very difficult to estimate accurately because the calculation of L 
requires knowledge of the but-for price and volume of sales, hence information about 
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the structure of demand. Thus, their estimation is likely to be subject to quite significant 
errors. For this reason, such penalties have very significant implementability problems 
and a low degree of transparency (high uncertainty) raising significantly the probability 
of being challenged for being false or discriminatory. For these reasons, they rarely 
form the basis of antitrust pubic enforcement sanctioning in practice.
Illegal gains-based penalties: these are also very difficult to estimate accurately 
through (2), as their estimation requires knowledge of the but-for price and volume of 
sales, hence about the structure of demand as well as cost information (to estimate m). 
Thus, their estimation is likely to be subject to quite significant errors, which implies 
that such penalties also have significant implementability problems and can create a 
low degree of transparency/significant amount of uncertainty.24
(Simple) revenue-based penalties: as is clear from Table 1, these owe their 
popularity to the fact that they score high in terms of easiness of implementability and 
also on transparency (low uncertainty).25
Overcharge-based penalties: their calculation is based on obtaining estimates of 
the price overcharge and, more importantly, the counterfactual volume of sales, hence, 
information about the structure of demand.26 This implies that this regime scores also 
low in implementability and transparency.
Sophisticated revenue-based penalties: their calculation requires the cartel 
revenue and estimates of the price overcharge.27 Thus, these penalties score ‘moderate’ 
in relation to ease of implementation and transparency. We note that they have exactly 
the same easeof implementation and transparency as for obtaining standard estimates of 
damages in private damage claims. Further comments in relation to this are provided 
in greater detail below. 
Simplified damage-based and illegal gains-based penalties: Exactly the same 
remarks as for sophisticated revenue-based penalties apply here.
Thus, we are led to the following:
24  Nevertheless, because they are thought to have good deterrence properties,as already noted, they are 
sometimes included in the penalty regimes adopted, though they are very rarely implemented in practice. 
Concerning their welfare properties, it should be stressed that, in terms of price effects, they are inferior 
to overcharge-based and damages-bases penalties (KATSOULACOS et al., 2015, 2017).
25 On the other hand, as mentioned below, these penalties are very weak in terms of their welfare properties.
26 It is the product of these that forms the ‘penalty base’ of this regime. Note that providing estimates of the 
overcharge (or the but-for price), as it is done for private damage claims, is much easier than doing this and 
also providing an estimate of the but-for volume of sales. See also discussion on implementation below. 
27 Of the cartel under investigation. The CA can obtain these estimates of the price overcharge using the 
relatively simple methodologies employed in private damage claims, as described for example by Brander 
and Ross (2006, 2017).
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: should there be a common approach to sanctioning...
12Rev. Econ. Contemp., v. 23, n. 2, p. 1 -20, mai./ago. 2019: e192321 DOI: 10.1590/198055272321
• Remark 1: The above discussion demonstrates thatsophisticated revenue-
based penalties are clearly superior judged in terms of easiness of implementation 
and in terms of transparency (low uncertainty), than the overcharge-based, the 
illegal gains-based and the damages-based penalties. They are equivalent to the 
simplified damages-based ant the simplified illegal gains-based penalties, while 
they do not perform as well, in terms of these criteria, as the simple revenue-
based penalties.
• Remark 2: The sophisticated revenue-based monetary penalties when 
( )
1SR
θρ θ
θ
 =  + 
 are the same asthe damages calculated in private damage claims, 
and the same as the simplified damages-based, as well as the simplified illegal 
gains-based, penalties.
2.2. WELFARE COMPARISONS
As we noted above, in a second-best world, in which legal and other constraints do not 
allow penalties to reach their first-best level28 and some cartels always form, it is 
important, when considering the welfare impact of cartel penalty regimes, to account 
for their effect on prices and not just on deterrence. Katsoulacos et al. (2015) show that 
the overcharge-based penalty regime ( )OF , given by (4), is welfare superior to an illegal 
gains-based regime (given by (2)) and, especially, to the simple revenue-based regime 
that is currently used (given by (3)). Specifically, having selected penalty rates 
appropriately to ensure deterrence equivalence across different penalty regimes, by 
adopting the overcharge-based regime, a CA can get superior price effects (prices that 
are below the monopoly level). Whereas, with an illegal gains-based regime, the price 
of cartels will be at the monopoly level and, with a simple revenue-based regime, the 
price of cartels will be above the monopoly level. A damages-based penalty (given by 
(1)), on the other hand, has equivalent welfare properties to an overcharge-based 
regime.29 Thus, we can say that overcharge-based and damages-based regimes have 
‘strong’ welfare properties, the illegal gains-based regime has ‘moderate’ welfare 
properties and the simple revenue-based has ‘poor’ welfare properties.
28  See, for example, Huba et al. (2017).
29  While KMU (2015) do not explicitly examine damages-based penalties, it is straightforward to show – 
see Appendix 2 – that under the latter cartel prices will also be under the monopoly level. 
DOI: 10.1590/198055272321
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: should there be a common approach to sanctioning...
13Rev. Econ. Contemp., v. 23, n. 2, p. 1 -20, mai./ago. 2019: e192321
The fundamental reason why the currently used simple revenue-based penalty 
regime has welfare inferior price effects is that under this regime the expected penalty 
is decreasing in the cartel price.This induces cartels to charge prices above the monopoly 
level. The overcharge-based and sophisticated revenue-based regimes, on the other 
hand, are increasing in the cartel price, inducing cartels to set prices below the 
monopoly level.
Katsoulacos et al. (2017) extend the model of Katsoulacos et al. (2015)30 and show 
that a sophisticated revenue-based regime, given by (5) with , is welfare superior in 
terms of both deterrence and price effects to a simple revenue-based regime – ensuring 
cartel prices below the monopoly level. Thus, the welfare properties of are certainly 
‘strong’, relative to the ‘poor’ welfare properties of RF . Indeed, Katsoulacos et al. (2017) 
show that the welfare properties of are superior, for a large range of parameter values 
(though not all), to the welfare properties of the overcharge-based penalty. Finally, 
Katsoulacos et al. (2017) show that the sophisticated revenue-based regime is welfare 
superior to the simplified damage-based and the simplified illegal gains-based regimes 
(given by (6’) and (2’), respectively).
2.3. OVERALL COMPARISONS
The conclusion from the previous two sub-sections is that the only regime that 
does not have low ease of implementation and low transparency and, thus, the only 
regime that CAs could consider adopting, which also has superior welfare properties 
(especially relative to the simple revenue-based) penalty regime, is the sophisticated 
revenue-based penalty regime. 
Table 2 summarizes this discussion, providing an overall comparison of the 
alternative penalty regimes across all the assessment criteria. It includes the simplified 
damages-based ( )DF and the simplified illegal gains-based ( )GF penalties given by:
 (7)
Which are exactly the damages as commonly calculatedin private damage claims.
30  KMU (2017) consider a range of different markets in which cartels may form, rather than a single ‘typi-
cal’ market (as in KMU, 2015), and assume that, in order to satisfy the principle of non-discrimination or 
equality of treatment, the penalty rates should not vary across markets. 
1
C
D GF F R
θ
θ
 = =  + 
 
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Table 2 – Summary of discussion of assessment criteria
 Assessment criterion
Penalty Regime 
Ease of Implementation Transparency/Certainty Welfare 
Damages-based, DF
Low Low Strong
Illegal gains-based, GF
Low Low Moderate
Overcharge-based, OF
Low Low Strong
Simple revenue-based, RF
High High Poor
Sophisticated revenue-based, SRF
Moderate Moderate Strong
Simplified damages – based, DF
Moderate Moderate Poor
Simplified illegal gains – based, GF
Moderate Moderate Poor
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Thus, we have:
• Remark 3: Among all the alternative penalty regimes that are welfare superior 
to the simple revenue-based penalties currently used, only the sophisticated 
revenue-based regime is likely to be also overall superior because it fares best, 
relative to all these other welfare superior alternative regimes, in terms of ease 
of implementation and transparency. 
Given that the sophisticated revenue-based regime is superior to the simple revenue-
based regime in terms of both its price effects and its deterrence effects, it is likely that these 
beneficial effects out weight any drawbacks in terms of ease of implementation and 
transparency. Therefore, we conclude that serious consideration should be given to switching 
the monetary penalty regime under public enforcement to a sophisticated revenue-based 
regime. We consider this recommendation in more detail in the next section. 
3. WHY CAs SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER SWITCHING TO THE  
SOPHISTICATED REVENUE-BASED PENALTIES?
Given the current state of knowledge, as reviewed in the previous sections, the only 
argument that can be used in order to justify the continuing use of the current simple 
revenue-based monetary penalties in the public enforcement against cartels, despite 
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their poor welfare properties, is that by doing so we avoid the implementability and 
transparency problems associated with getting estimates of the overcharge. Here, we 
take a careful look at these problems.
The implementability and transparency concerns raised by the need to calculate 
the price overcharge, as under the sophisticated revenue-based regime, are often vastly 
overstated. To explain why we consider this, we note that the overcharge in cartel cases 
has been a magnitude routinely estimated for many years in private damage claims to 
calculate damages, as given by expression (6’) above. These have been a very important 
feature of the North America jurisdictions and were introduced in EU competition 
policy in 2014, becoming gradually popular in the EU countries too. It is now well 
recognized that there are many mature alternative methodologies for the estimation of 
the overcharge in damages claims that range from a low to a high degree of sophistication 
and so, as two prominent authors in this area wrote recently, 
Overall, we feel that a great deal of progress in damage estimation and related topics 
has been made in the past two decades. In addition, data availability has significantly 
improved and computing power has increased greatly. Therefore, good estimates of 
damages from price-fixing and related anticompetitive practices can often be obtained. 
(BRANDER and ROSS, 2016; ROSS, 2006)
An often raised additional concern, when the issue of having to calculate the 
overcharge in order to take it into account in setting monetary penalties, is that CAs 
would be overburdened if they became responsible for this. As the argument goes, in 
private damages claims the estimation is undertaken by those claiming damages and the 
Courts just have to balance the evidence presented and choose between these and the 
counter estimates made by the defendants. However, a moment’s thought indicates that 
this is certainly not a strong argument. There is nothing to stop the CAs to request from 
the parties (defendants and plaintiffs) to make their estimates of the price overcharge 
available, with detailed justification, together with all the other documents that they are 
asked to produce during the investigative procedure. Indeed, such a request, if mandatory, 
would likely have beneficial welfare effects since it would increase the costs to cartel 
offenders of being detected – having to try to show low overcharge rates before this is 
required for dealing with private damage claims, and would incentivise plaintiffs not to 
make false claims of law violation. Of course, there would be cases, in which there would 
be no claimants and the CA would open an investigation ex officio. But in these cases too, 
it is certainly possible, and this has been the standard practice in ex officio investigations, 
for the CA to call on those that have been harmed by the cartel and to request them to 
provide evidence of the extent to which they were harmed – hence, of the overcharge 
rate. Clearly, these third parties would have ample incentives to provide this information 
since this wouldalso be used in private damages claims.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taking into account the above arguments, it seems very strange that, if it is so widely 
accepted to pay damages (as estimated in practice, using (6) or (7)), under private 
enforcement, there is an opposition31 to doing essentially the same – i.e. base the 
calculation of monetary penalties on an expression like (5)- under public enforcement. 
One possible explanation for this opposition is that the case has not been articulated 
in the past, taking into account all the considerations discussed above and, in particular, 
the welfare distortions of the currently used penalty regime, stressed in the recent 
economic literature.
Another consideration that may be relevant concerns the acceptable burden of proof 
under private and public enforcement. To use the US example, US Courts have held that 
while, for claiming damages, plaintiffs must show the existence of an injury with a 
‘reasonable degree of certainty’, the proof of the amount of a plaintiff ’s damages is subject 
to a lower burden of proof (J. Truett Payne Co. vs. Chrysler Motors, 1981). The Supreme 
Court has held that damages may be shown using a “just and reasonable estimate, based 
on relevant data, including both ‘probable and inferential as well as direct and positive 
proof ’ (Zenith Radio Corp. vs Hazeltine Research Inc., 1969). Thus, Courts have 
recognized the inherently lower ability to estimate damages and have accepted damage 
estimates based on reasoned analysis and partial information. Is there a reasonable 
reason why, what is accepted by Courts as burden of proof for private damages claims, 
should not or cannot be accepted by CAs? This is a legal rather than an economic 
question: should the burden of proof be higher for estimating penalties to punish and 
deter wrongdoing than for estimating them in order to compensate those that have been 
harmed by the wrong-doing? This point has not been explicitly argued and justified. For 
as long as this remains the case, it does not seem possible to provide a convincing case 
for maintaining the current policy on monetary penalties in public antitrust enforcement. 
This constitutes the main conclusion of this paper. 
31 Beyond that associated with normal and to some extent understandable institutional inertia.
DOI: 10.1590/198055272321
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: should there be a common approach to sanctioning...
17Rev. Econ. Contemp., v. 23, n. 2, p. 1 -20, mai./ago. 2019: e192321
REFERENCES
ALLAIN, M-L.; BOYER, M.; PONSSARD, J-P. The determination of optimal fines in cartel 
cases: theory and practice. Concurrences – Competition Law Journal, n. 4, p. 32-40, 2011.
BAGERI, V.; KATSOULACOS, Y.; SPAGNOLO, G. The distortive effects of antitrust fines based 
on revenue. The Economic Journal, v. 123, n. 572, p. 545-557, 2013.
BAGERI, V.; KATSOULACOS, Y.A simple quantitative methodology for the setting of optimal fines 
by antitrust and regulatory authorities. European Competition Journal, v. 10, p. 253-278, 2014.
BECKER, G. S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, n. 
76, p. 169-217, 1968.
BOS, I. et al. Does enforcement deter cartels? A tale of two tails. In: EARIE 2016 CONFERENCE, 
Lisbon, Portugal, 26-28 aug. 2016. 
BOYER, M.; KOTCHONI, R. How much do cartel overcharge? Review of Industrial Organization, 
v. 47, n. 2, p. 119-153, 2015.
BRANDER J. A.; ROSS, T. W. Estimating damages form price-fixing. Canadian Class Action 
Review, v. 3, n. 1, p. 335-369, 2006.
BRANDER, J. A.; ROSS, T. W. Estimating damages to direct and indirect purchasers in price-
fixing actions. Canadian Competition Law Review, v. 30, n. 1, p. 1-39, 2017.
BUCCIROSSI, P.; SPAGNOLO, G. “Optimal fines in the era of whistle blowers - Should price 
fixers still go to prison?” In: GOSHAL, V.; STENNEK, J. (Eds). The political economy of 
antitrust. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007. 
CONNOR, J. M.; LANDE, R. H. “Cartel over charges and optimal cartel fines”. In: WALLER, S. 
(Ed.). Issues in competition law and policy. v. 3. Chicago: American Bar Association, 2008.
DARGAUD, E.; MANTOVANI, A.; REGGIANI, C. Cartel punishment and distortive effects of 
fines. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, v. 12, n. 2, p. 375-399, jun. 2016.
DENG, J.; KATSOULACOS, Y. Anti-trust sanctioning in China: how can the NDRC guidelines 
be further improved?” Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 14 aug. 2017.
HARRINGTON, J. Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority. The Rand 
Journal of Economics, n. 35, v. 651-673, 2004.
HARRINGTON, J. Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority. International 
Economic Review, v. 46, n. 1, p. 145-170, 2005.
HARRINGTON, J. Comment on antitrust sanctions. Competition Policy International, v. 6, n. 2, 
p. 41-51, 2010.
HOUBA, H.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; WEN, Q. Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent 
fines and detection probabilities. Economics Bulletin, v. 30, n. 3, p. 2017-2027, 2010.
HOUBA, H.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; WEN, Q. Legal principles in antitrust enforcement. The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, v. 120, n. 3, p. 859-893, 2018.
ICN – INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK. Setting Fines for Cartels in ICN 
Jurisdictions. Report to the 7th Annual Conference, Kyoto, April 2008. Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008.
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: should there be a common approach to sanctioning...
18Rev. Econ. Contemp., v. 23, n. 2, p. 1 -20, mai./ago. 2019: e192321 DOI: 10.1590/198055272321
KATSOULACOS, Y.; METSIOU, E. “The economics of antitrust sanctioning: a brief review”. In: 
BONAKELET.; FOX, E.; MACNUBE, L. (Eds.). Competition policy for the new era: insights 
from BRICS and developing countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
KATSOULACOS, Y.; ULPH, D. Antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence 
on cartel overcharges. The Economic Journal, v. 123, n. 572, p. 558-581, 2013.
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Penalizing cartels: the case for basing 
penalties on price overcharge. International Journal of Industrial Organization, v. 42, p. 70-
80, 2015.
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Penalizing on the basis of the severity of 
the offence: a sophisticated revenue-based cartelpenalty. TILEC Discussion Papers, n. 2017-
014. Available at: <http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/SSRN-KMU%20Penalties%20
May%202017.pdf>. 
LANDES W. M. Optimal sanctions for antitrust violations. The University of Chicago Law 
Review, v. 50, n. 2, p. 652-678, 1983.
LEVENSTEIN, M. C.; SUSLOW, V. Y. Breaking up is hard to do: determinants of cartel duration. 
Journal of Law and Economics, v. 54, n. 2, p. 455‐492, 2011.
LEVENSTEIN, M. C.; SUSLOW, V. Y. Cartels and collusion – empirical evidence. Ross School of 
Business Paper, n. 1182, nov. 2012. Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182565>. 
LEVENSTEIN, M. C.; SUSLOW, V. Y. Price fixing hits home: an empirical study of price fixing 
conspiracies in the US. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, jan. 2014, mimeo.
OECD - ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. 
Fighting Hard-Core Cartels: harm, effective sanctions and leniency programs. Paris: OECD, 
2002.
WONG-ERVIN, K. et al. Monetary penalties in China and Japan. GMU Antonin Scalia Law 
School, DP 16-40; CPI cct. 2016.
DOI: 10.1590/198055272321
KATSOULACOS, Y.; MOTCHENKOVA, E.; ULPH, D. Public and private antitrust enforcement for cartels: should there be a common approach to sanctioning...
19Rev. Econ. Contemp., v. 23, n. 2, p. 1 -20, mai./ago. 2019: e192321
Appendix 1
Diagram 1: Diagrammatic representation 
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Damages-based penalty: area A+L
Illegal gains-based penalty: area A-B
Appendix 2
The price effects of a damages-based penalty
Damages is the reduction in consumer surplus compared to what would have 
accrued under the counter-factual “but-for” situation. They are given by:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 2
1
2
C B B C
C B C C B C C B B
C C C B B B C
p p Q Q p
p p Q p p p Q p p p Q
p c Q p p p Q p c Q p
− −
 − + = − + − 
 = − + − − − 
Therefore, expected profits with penalties on damages are:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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We can see that:
• A tax on damages acts like a combination of a tax on profits (first term on 
expression on RHS above), plus an overcharge-based tax (second term on 
RHS), plus a subsidy to output (third term on RHS).
• In the “first-best” world in which 2τ = ,a cartel would set C Bp p= - there is 
no possibility of getting more than but-for profits.
• In a second-best world where 2τ <  it would set a price below the monopoly 
price, as under an overcharge-based regime. If the cartel was faced with a 
penalty on profits (first term on RHS only would be relevant) then it would set 
the monopoly price. The second term (tax on overcharge) induces the cartel to 
reduce price (given the fixed counterfactual output volume) and the third term 
(subsidy on output) induces the cartel to increase its output: thus, the second 
and third terms explain why the cartel’s optimal price under a damages-based 
penalty regime would be below the monopoly price. 
